Date Presented:

11 August

Abstract:

In contemporary ethical theorizing, Wittgenstein is categorized as a particularist (O Neill 1996). Moral claims are reached and advanced not in terms of abstract universal principles but in terms of acquired sensitivities to the requirements of particular situations. Because of this, his position is taken to have the same limitations that come with relativism. These include arbitrariness, self refutation and outright endorsement of evil practices. The paper argues that this reading is mistaken. Though Wittgenstein emphasized flexibility and variability, there are passages in his later work which allow for a notion of moral universality that escapes the limitations of relativism. Wittgenstein’s moral position cannot simply be assimilated with existing forms of ethical relativism and moral objectivism. (http://wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-alws/article/view/2829/3382)