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“Return the Lake to the People”: Populist Political Rhetoric and the Fate of a Resource Frontier in the Philippines

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In this article, I examine the shifting political ecologies of governance of Laguna Lake, Philippines, in the context of historical and contemporary populist political rhetoric. Rodrigo Duterte, who was elected president in 2016 through a platform of change, brought national attention again to the lake by promising to give it back to the people marginalized by decades-long elite capture. This populist rhetoric is the latest in attempts to manage an urban resource frontier with conflicting demands and uses. By narrating a history of governance of Laguna Lake, I trace parallels between current and past strategies of addressing resource conflicts: from Ferdinand Marcos’s authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s and the pluralist modes that followed to Duterte’s law-and-order vision of development. By comparing the populist narratives of Marcos and Duterte, I demonstrate that populist rhetoric in authoritarian forms entails the contradictory processes of politicization of the problem and depoliticization of solutions. Authoritarian populist narratives transform the framing of environmental problems through antagonistic politics even as solutions are constrained within existing depoliticized technologies of government that limit the spaces of contestations. Key Words: authoritarian, Duterte, Laguna Lake, Marcos, populism.

En este artículo examino las cambiantes políticas ecológicas de gobernanza del Lago Laguna, Filipinas, en el contexto retórico de la política populista histórica y contemporánea. Rodrigo Duterte, quien fue elegido presidente en 2016 en base en una plataforma de cambio, atajo de nuevo la atención nacional hacia el lago prometiendo devolverlo a la gente marginada luego de la captura de la élite, prolongada durante décadas. Esta retórica populista es el más reciente intento de manejar una frontera de recursos urbanos dentro de demandas y usos en conflicto. Narrando una historia de gobernanza del Lago Laguna, hago paralelos entre las estrategias actuales y pasadas para considerar conflictos por recursos: del férreo autoritarismo de Ferdinando Marcos en los años 1970 y 1980 y los modos pluralistas que siguieron, hasta llegar a la visión del desarrollo dentro de la ley y el orden de Duterte. Comparando las narrativas populistas de Marcos y Duterte, demuestro que la retórica populista en formas autoritarias implica los procesos contradictorios de politización del problema y depoliticización de las soluciones. Las narrativas populistas autoritarias transforman el marco de los problemas ambientales por medio de políticas antagonísticas aun cuando las soluciones están confeccionadas dentro de las actuales tecnologías despoliticizadas de gobierno que limitan los espacios de las controversias. Palabras clave: el autoritario, Duterte, Laguna Lake, Marcos, populismo.

What is the place of populism and narratives of the people in authoritarian and pluralist modes of governing contentious resources? How does populist political rhetoric attempt to justify authoritarian and technocratic rule in resource conflict? In this article, I take the problem of
Laguna Lake, the largest in the Philippines and a significant urban resource frontier, to examine how populist narratives have unfolded in more than four decades of state intervention in resource conflicts. Comparing the authoritarian populist political rhetoric of the former president Ferdinand Marcos and the current president Rodrigo Duterte, I find a contradiction: Populist narratives about resource conflicts entail a dual moment of politicization of the problem and depoliticization of solutions that appear to challenge yet maintain existing modes of governance. While politicizing antagonistic relations between the people and its enemy, authoritarian populist narratives also limit the possibilities of political engagement through a recourse to technocratic, depoliticized solutions.

Populism in its authoritarian form is not new in the spaces of governance in the Philippines and in the postcolonial Global South. Its reemergence amid a supposed postpolitical condition of neoliberal, pluralist, consensus-based environmental politics, however, necessitates empirical work sensitive to the multiple historical and contemporary forms of populism. I contribute to this task by investigating the politics of resource governance of Laguna Lake.

Decades of resource conflict in Laguna Lake between small-scale fisherfolk and large-scale fish pen owners have captured the national imagination as an example of elite-driven social justice problem that the state had routinely failed to address. Through the fish pen technology, the state introduced aquaculture in the lake to improve incomes of small-scale fisherfolk and increase fish productivity. Elite capture by middle-class entrepreneurs and fishing corporations from outside the lake, however, led to the unchecked proliferation of large-scale fish pen structures that displaced fisherfolk from their traditional fishing grounds and resulted in recurring conflict. In many ways, Laguna Lake’s aquaculture problem has symbolized many of the country’s developmental ills and has subsequently attracted exercises in authoritarian interventions.

Seeking to depart radically from the status quo, both Marcos and Duterte deployed populist rhetoric by coupling narratives of conflict and social justice with authoritarian techniques of management. Marcos, the late strongman who was president for twenty years, sought to solve the lake’s aquaculture problem by employing a rhetoric that was pro-poor and anti-elite. Yet, his interventions were restricted to the authoritarian developmentalist modes of efficient planning, anticonflict compromise, and the rule of law, which legitimized capitalist aquaculture in the lake.

The promise of change and the specter of a return to authoritarian rule accompanied Duterte’s election in 2016. Despite lacking a coherent vision for the environment, Laguna Lake became a testing ground for his law-and-order developmentalism not very different from Marcos. Duterte, in his first State of the Nation address, instructed state agencies to review permits granted to Laguna Lake aquaculture, punctuating a procedural administrative order with the populist language of protecting the country, giving the lake back to the marginalized, and promising fisherfolk “priority in its entitlements” (Duterte 2016). Yet, his government’s subsequent actions and plans mirror past strategies that constrict possible socioecological futures for fisherfolk.

Drawing from an analysis of secondary sources and other published materials on Laguna Lake during the Marcos and Duterte presidencies, I probe the contradictions of authoritarian populist political rhetoric where politicization of the problem through antagonism is paired with depoliticized modes of state governance. I begin with a brief discussion of debates linking populism and the political and then describe Laguna Lake resource controversies and the response of Marcos’s authoritarian developmentalist regime. Next, I discuss the reemergence of populist narratives in Duterte’s revival of the lake’s antagonistic relations. Last, I reflect on both moments to illustrate the place of populist political rhetoric in environmental governance and its implications for the future of resource production and relations in the lake.

**Populist Politics in Resource Governance**

Political ecologists have documented in rich historical–geographical detail the multiple evolving forms that environmental governance has taken, in the process posing questions about what constitutes the state, the political, and the people (Bridge 2014; Robertson 2015). In Latin America, for example, political–ecological work on neo-extractivism and hydrocarbon governance have contributed to these debates by tracing the links between narratives of the people, resources, and the nation (Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Kohl and Farthing 2012). Revisiting the state, the political, and the people becomes even more relevant with the recent global resurgence of
populist politics in an era where environmental issues have taken on a postpolitical character.

Swyngedouw (2009) perhaps provided the most explicit theoretical engagement of populism and contemporary environmental politics in geography, arguing how populist tactics are “the symptomatic expression of a post-political condition” (611). Postpolitics is characterized by the replacement of the political—conflict, dissent, and contestations—with the politics of consensus and technocratic management, wherein contentious problems are reduced to matters of policy technologies and administration (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). Symptomatic of a liberal democratic order, postpolitics narrows down possibilities and downplays conflict. Good governance discourses via compromise, consensus, inclusion, and participation among various stakeholders have been widely deployed in place of the political. Because much postpolitical literature deploys a highly specific definition of the truly political, the analytical implications and usefulness of such restriction has also been contested by some critics (McCarthy 2013; Beveridge and Koch 2017).

For Swyngedouw (2009), populist imaginaries contribute to construct the postpolitical condition characterized by depoliticized governance and the evacuation of the political in resolving environmental problems. If the political is necessarily antagonistic (Mouffe 2005), his diagnosis, however, misses a crucial element of tactics to deploy populist narratives: They entail moments of politicization as much as depoliticization. Populism relies on antagonistic politics in identifying a problem, which might pave the path for the particular, often depoliticized solutions familiar to scholars of the postpolitical. In challenging the status quo, populist politics builds on a necessary conflict between the people and its other (Panizza 2005), which is assigned blame for (environmental) problems. In authoritarian forms of populism, this is accompanied by a narrowing of the possibilities of how such matters might be addressed. Identifying the enemy and taking action against the enemy lends strength to the power of populist narratives. This dual moment of politicization and depoliticization serves multiple purposes, including the hegemonic legitimation and construction of a political project, a regime, or the state, such as in authoritarian populism (Scoones et al. 2018). Authoritarian populism challenges the dominant pluralist modes of governance by politicizing the problem, yet it mirrors the latter’s strategy of depoliticizing the spaces of engagement.

Defining populism and identifying its place in politics and democracy continue to be the subject of debate in political theory and beyond (Laclau 2005; Ranciere 2016). I find Panizza’s (2005) nonessentialist approach to the term useful for this article, though, because it views populism as a “mode of identification” rather than an inherent characteristic possessed by individuals or social movements. Antagonism is the mode of identification central to populist strategies. It constructs both the people to whom the populist speaks (Ranciere 2016) and the other or the political frontier that needs to be defeated for the people (Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). Both the people and the enemy are empty signifiers, in that they may take various discursive forms. Populist narratives often pose the need to undermine existing social order and disrupt status quo by vanquishing the enemy that oppresses the people and by giving control back to the underdogs. They invoke a “promise of plenitude” once these antagonisms have been resolved (Panizza 2005).

In its authoritarian guise, populism negates politics by creating a shared vision of people and leader working together toward one solution (Panizza 2005), which parallels the postpolitical mode of anti-conflict, consensus-based, and inclusive pluralist governance in nonauthoritarian contexts. Populism, however, simultaneously politicizes by elevating antagonistic relations. This duality is crucial in the narrative power and the eventual outcomes of populist politics in different historical contexts. In the Global South with authoritarian postcolonial histories, we need to ask, for example, how a resurgent populism intersects with, undermines, or supports existing structures transformed by adoption of post-political modes of governance. The interplay of politicization and depoliticization therefore deserves further place-based empirical investigation to understand how populist narratives shape the contemporary landscape of environmental governance.

Marcos’s Populist Political Rhetoric: Authoritarian Developmentalism and Managing Resource Controversies

Laguna Lake has presented the state with a host of problems rooted in its complex historical production
as an urban resource frontier. Since 1966, the lake has served as a site for pioneering, foreign-loan-funded projects aimed at harnessing it as a resource—from improving fish production through aquaculture to serving as sink for urban stormwaters and a source of domestic water. The lake has been a site of several governance innovations—state regulation, community-based projects, and hybrid private–public partnerships, among others—to manage such multiple conflicting demands (Saguin 2016). These often came with a developmental and urban justification, reflecting both its location and connections with nearby Metro Manila and its place in the history of twentieth-century high modern, grand plans of controlling nature (Saguin 2017). The modern visions of harnessing the lake as a resource reached a peak under Marcos’s infrastructure-driven authoritarian developmentalism in the 1970s and 1980s.

The history of Laguna Lake fisheries presents a classic political ecological case of the state attempting to manage the contradictions of resource frontier production. Aquaculture became an important governance problem for the state because of the rapid, unregulated proliferation of fish pen structures and the social unrest that followed. Initially introduced to improve incomes of poorer fisherfolk communities, it quickly became an elite venture, as knowledge and financial capital of Manila-based entrepreneurs and fishing corporations enabled them to take over fish production in the lake.

Owing to the high profitability and cheap appropriation of the lake’s ecological surpluses in the 1970s, several urban middle-class groups (politicians, celebrities, foreigners) also invested in aquaculture operations, contributing to the fish pen rush that by the early 1980s had occupied close to a third of the 90,000-ha lake space. This rush has been met with resentment by lake fisherfolk, whose fishing grounds have been severely reduced. Fisherfolk developed antagonistic relations that have escalated to violent encounters with armed fish pen guards employed to watch over what have now become highly valuable fish. Fisherfolk have continually framed the problem as a social justice issue, claiming prime legitimacy of use and advocating their right to continue to freely make a living off the lake (Saguin 2016).

What came to be known as the fish pen controversy took off in the national imagination after the deaths of fisherfolk and fish pen workers in 1982 and 1983. The state had long attempted to regulate fish pens through demolitions of unlicensed structures outside zoning belts, but institutional confusion between the lake management body and local government units and the strong political clout and connections of fish pen owners and associations have made these piecemeal efforts routinely ineffective.

Plans for Laguna Lake’s production as an urban resource frontier preceded Marcos’s imposition of martial law in 1972, which paved the way for centralized, authoritarian rule for more than a decade. The lake, however, became an arena for his visions of development, playing a role in his desire to create a “New Society” out of the destruction of the old political and social order. With the support of technocrats, business cronies, and the military, he ruled through constitutional authoritarianism (Noble 1986; Teehankee 2017) and continually deployed elements of populist discourse to legitimate his regime. Appealing to the poor and the people’s sense of being marginalized by the ruling elites, he sought to correct structures that caused persistent inequality and hindered development by targeting two enemy groups: the communists and the rural landlord elites (Anderson 1988). The strong antipathy toward elites might have little to do with a genuine concern for the plight of the poor and more with his desire to rule over the established oligarchs and consolidate local political and economic elite power at the national level (Anderson 1988; Teehankee 2017; Bello 2018).

Through his technocrats, he crafted an economic strategy that relied on securing foreign borrowing to fund large-scale, grand infrastructure projects, including several Laguna Lake development projects such as a hydraulic control structure, flood control structures, a fish pen development project, and a cooperative development project. More than his predecessors, Marcos espoused a form of populist nationalism (Webb 2017) that promised change for the nonelites long marginalized and indignified by those in power. This intersected with a developmental regime characterized by technocratic solutions to social problems, effectively cultivating an image of a strongman with political will and efficient planning tools empathetic to the plight of the poor. It must be pointed out, however, that technocracy under the Marcos authoritarian regime was peopled by elites with multiple, sometimes competing, economic and political interests (Tadem 2013).

The fate of the lake during the martial law years articulated Marcos’s mixing of populist nationalism
and technocratic developmentalism in managing environmental problems. When the fish pen controversy exploded, Marcos intervened through a series of Letters of Instructions, ordering various agencies to regulate fish pen sprawl. He simultaneously secured foreign loans to fund a national cooperative development project designed to enable displaced fisherfolk access to the fish pen technology. Marcos sought “to democratize the benefits derived from the lake by providing the marginal users of the same opportunities to own, manage and operate fishpens” (Marcos 1984) to ensure “the participation of lakeshore dwellers … in the development of the lake” (Marcos 1983b). To the elites, he was quoted as saying that they would be asked to share the pens with the small fishermen: “This is social justice in action” (Ng 1983, 16).

Although ringing with the high politics of long-overdue redistributive justice, this strategy effectively flattened the highly unequal relations between fish pen owners and fisherfolk in the lake. Rather than a radical reordering of lake social relations and spaces of politics, the selective demolitions and cooperative projects ended up legitimizing elite fish pen presence in the lake as long as they remained within the zoning belts, while building fisherfolk capacity to compete side by side these privately owned pens.

For Marcos and his propagandists, a peaceful coexistence and a “happy compromise” could be reached between the two antagonistic parties through proper planning and management without undermining the ability of fish pens to make money off the lake (Samonte 1983). Then—First Lady Imelda Marcos, after meeting with both sides, concluded that “with better planning and technology, both pen operators and fishermen could make a living off the lake without conflict” (“FL Vows” 1983, 1). What began as a political project that highlighted the antagonism as the root cause of lake problems ended up as a compromise between the two parties, mediated by technologies of government to avoid conflict: characteristics of depoliticized governance. Quelling rural unrest and communist influence over the lake provided immediate justification for the Marcos regime to contain the conflict. As part of his authoritarian developmentalist model, the need for compromise and efficient planning was a reaction to “the increasing pressure of urban growth and development” that needed to be “responsive to the demands of the various beneficial users thereof” (Marcos 1983a). This marked the beginning of a governance shift from the sectorally specific fisheries regulation to a multiuse lake resource management.

Through the dual strategy of proper zoning and demolition of unruly and illegal fish pens while redistributing freed-up space for fisherfolk to engage in aquaculture, Marcos was able to strike a solution that was both populist and anti-elite but without undermining the status quo of capitalist-driven aquaculture. Addressing the fish pen controversy became politicized through a mode of identification that antagonized the elites and the people while bringing in notions of social justice, both of which aligned with his vision of the New Society. Fish pen governance became immediately depoliticized, however, through a recourse to the technocratic solutions of adhering to strict zoning of use arranged according to neat, geometric belts based on a computed carrying capacity (rationalization) complemented by the simultaneous redistribution of demolished fish pen sites and building of financial capacity of fisherfolk (democratization). The two anodyne terms of rationalization and democratization—limiting the fish pens to legal limits while attempting to give fisherfolk a chance at the fish pen technology—would recur throughout the next three decades of lake management.

Subsequent administrations would adopt similar technocratic governance mechanisms to lake problems, downplaying the antagonism between pens and fisherfolk. Through a discourse of good governance, the post-Marcos administrations would use the lake as an experimental site for innovations—increasingly turning to neoliberal modes of addressing the environmental problems of the lake—to maintain the multiple resource use of the lake. Fisherfolk interests needed to complement a broad set of other user needs: the narrative shifting to that of integrated management of various stakeholders at the scale of the watershed. The role of a strong state armed with a discourse of returning the lake to the dispossessed fisherfolk would emerge again in the wake of Duterte’s election as president.

Duterte’s Populist Political Rhetoric: Returning the Lake to the People and the Promise of Plenitude

Duterte shares with Marcos an affinity for populist rhetoric and authoritarian tendencies. The thirty-
year interim between Marcos’s forced exile that ended his dictatorship and Duterte’s rise to the presidency has been characterized by successive governments that promoted the virtues of liberal democracy, employed a discourse of good governance, embraced neoliberal economic policies, and saw elite reshuffling of power at the national level (Thompson 2016; Teehankee 2017; Bello 2018). Duterte’s emphasis on change, his illiberal language, and his steadfast promise of ridding the country of the drug menace—constructing drug users and drug lords as the primary enemy—contributed to his broad appeal across all classes discontented with the failures of the status quo.

Duterte has publicly admired Marcos’s strongman qualities and has mirrored a few of his policies, including an infrastructure construction push and subscribing to his brand of authoritarian developmentalism. Even if he lacks a coherent strategy, like Marcos before him, he has emphasized the importance of law and order as a prerequisite to addressing poverty and delivering development (Quimpo 2017). His brutal “war on drugs” has been his administration’s most radical break from previous governments, even as he has not steered too far from his predecessors in many other aspects, such as his continuation of neoliberal economic policies.

Bringing attention back to the forty-year-old Laguna Lake fish pen controversy provided Duterte with an opportunity to display this strongman vision of development via order and his politics of change. In a little over a year, he and his technocrats have mobilized a populist narrative that targeted elites, where the country’s social and environmental ills could be solved through political will coupled with proper management and deployment of police or military force, if necessary.

Duterte would mention seeing from an airplane crowded structures sticking out prominently in the lake’s landscape, observing the nature of the problem from afar: “Whenever I look down there … those triangles … you could not see (spaces) … and the fishermen are left with nothing” (Nilles 2016). The sight of geometric fish pen structures crowding out the space for small fisherfolk seems to encapsulate government inaction, unbridled influence of elite power, and neglect of social justice. Part of the appeal of turning attention to the lake’s fish pen problem was that it was visual and affective; images of fish pen structures being dismantled showed a state in action. After months of uncertainty as to whether to remove all pens (zero-fish-pen policy), state agencies used scientific studies on the lake’s carrying capacity to rationalize or determine the total size of structures to be demolished (a quarter of the 13,000-ha structures; Geronimo 2017).

Laguna Lake was important to the administration as it was to be a “showcase of social justice” (Department of Environment and Natural Resources 2016). The success of fish pen demolitions became even more crucial to show the change his administration had promised, following the fizzling of a mining operations crackdown that saw the suspension of more than 100 mining operations before being revoked after staunch opposition from the sector and from within the government (Bello 2018). The controversies surrounding mining showed competing interests among technocrats within the administration, which have not played out to the same degree in Laguna Lake.

After Duterte’s statements, technocrats would repeat a similar populist discourse on Laguna Lake: With the new administration focused on law and order, it was time for the elites to return the lake to the people. The goal was to bring the lake back to its glory days of bounty (the “promise of plenitude”) after decades of exploitation. After the first round of demolitions, the environment secretary was quoted: “(This is) how (the lake) should be—for the people and not for big corporations who don’t even give back to the people” (Pazzibugan 2017). The elite constructed as the enemy in this case were fish pen operators, who “have benefited and profited from the lake region since the ’70s” (Pazzibugan 2017). It was time for the ordinary people to benefit from the lake.

The rhetoric of antagonism between a simplified elite and people was supported by Duterte’s embodiment of the collective desire to take back power from the few. It also justifies the means necessary for this to happen, including using, as one lawmaker put it, “military, navy, all forces of government at the fingertips of the President” (Geronimo 2016). Duterte’s threats against fish pen operators resembled similar statements he made against those he identified as enemies of the Filipino people (drug users, vocal critics of human rights violations, opposition politicians), with threats often taking on a personalistic tone: “If you don’t want to make it smaller, I will destroy it … it will be my direct order and I will assume full responsibility for them” (Ranada
2016). This reflects a key populist mode of identification that makes the political personal (Panizza 2005). The effect of such rhetoric is to bring dignity to the marginalized and wresting power away from the elites to the benefit of the leader (Thompson 2016). It also shows the continuing process of state construction and legitimization through these narratives and practices.

Fish pen owners have responded by reiterating their contribution to the fish supply and food security in Metro Manila, their economic links with fisherfolk livelihoods, and their minimal ecological impacts on the lake (Cinco 2017). Yet, as with past government threats, they promised to cooperate in regulating fish pens and emphasized their place in any efforts to plan and govern the lake. Fisherfolk, meanwhile, have long lamented the ineffectiveness of attempts to remove illegal fish pens from the lake and have recognized the role of elite power in their continued plight (Saguin 2016). Marcos’s failure to resolve the fish pen controversy had made Laguna Lake fisherfolk carefully optimistic when Duterte brought up his fish pen plan. After Duterte’s initial statement, the largest national fisherfolk alliance mentioned how the fisherfolk had long waited for “a leader who will address the welfare of small fishers” (Nilles 2016) and expressed support for the demolition drive. Several months later, they commented that it was one of the administration’s prominent achievements but that it was not nearly enough (Cinco and Celis 2017).

Several fisherfolk expressed worry that a zero-fishpen policy would create income losses for lake dwellers who have forged livelihood connections with the deeply embedded fish pen economy. Forty years of fish pen presence in the lake has enabled thousands of fishers and lake dwellers to engage in fish-pen-related work such as drag seining for harvest, fish trading and transporting, and seed production. As fishing-based lake dwellers formed strong economic linkages with fish pens in a time of subsiding violence and conflicts, they have developed a more ambiguous opinion about continued fish pen presence in the lake. The simple antagonism between the fisherfolk and fish pens betrays these multiple livelihoods and relations that also condition how particular fisherfolk view the fish pen dismantling issue (Saguin 2018).

Despite the politicization of the lake issue through antagonistic politics, the governance strategy has remained firmly within the technocratic management language and practice of rationalization and democratization reminiscent of Marcos-era strategies. This has taken the form of plans to organize fisherfolk into cooperatives to increase fish pen ownership and provide them with greater space in fish pen allocation (Geronimo 2017). The solution, methods, and spaces of engagement have been predetermined by the state to follow its vision of law-and-order development. It is notable how fisherfolk remained passive and absent apart from being rendered as recipient of state development plans or as one in the many stakeholders in the lake. Similar to the good governance discourses, solutions to the lake’s problem have been constrained by a narrow optic of how fisherfolk could participate in shaping their futures. The unambiguous antagonism between fisherfolk and fish pens is a powerful but reductive narrative about resource conflicts in the lake that enabled ready solutions to be implemented. The history of lake governance to address resource conflicts therefore has exhibited a mixture of both depoliticized authoritarian and liberal democratic strategies.

Perhaps the biggest irony of the “return the lake to the people” narrative is the proposal to bring the lake back to its “original, pristine condition” and convert it to an ecotourism zone (Gamil 2017). Dismantling unsightly fish pen structures therefore becomes a precondition for transforming the lake “into a vibrant economic zone showcasing ecotourism” (Duterte 2016), an activity that undermines the productive use of the lake for fisheries. Business interests have expressed support in formulating a new master plan for the lake (Mercurio 2016), which fisherfolk groups have opposed and read as attempts to privatize the lake (Alcober 2017).

**Conclusion**

In this article, I showed how populist political rhetoric serves to both politicize environmental problems and depoliticize efforts to address them. Laguna Lake under Marcos and Duterte demonstrates this contradiction in resource governance. Unlike leaders who remained firmly within the reformist liberal democracy tradition that extolled the value of pluralist good governance, both promised a change in status quo by eliminating the old configuration of elite power and giving control back to fisherfolk. The lake—a visible social justice problem—served as a
showcase for their vision. For Marcos, it was the New Society and authoritarian developmentalism in action that was at stake. For Duterte, it was the change he promised to deliver through political will and law and order. Rather than matching the radical vision promised by their populist narratives, however, the actions they have mobilized and solutions proposed have remained largely within the confines of the existing repertoire of governance strategies. In the lake, this has taken the form of the technocratic language of rationalization and democratization not fundamentally different from the status quo of post-political modes of governance. The politicized antagonistic construction of political identities has been matched by depoliticized methods that flatten conflicts.

Plans for ecotourism similarly undermine the productive use of the lake for fisherfolk. This political ecological tension between a productive and a pristine future signals how crises might serve a crucial role in the regulation of capitalist relations in a resource frontier. In Laguna Lake, populist narratives have enabled depoliticized modes of governance to maintain and legitimize the presence of fish pens. Yet the very same narratives open the possibility for the restructuring of agrarian relations once entrenched institutional frameworks and regimes of accumulation are rendered obsolete.

Authoritarian populist rhetoric transforms the framing of environmental problems even as solutions are constrained within technologies of government that do not open up spaces of contestations. Populist rhetoric draws strength from its ability to navigate this contradiction. Calls for emancipatory politics therefore need to recognize and confront the vision of radical democracy that underpins the power of such rhetoric.

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